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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
WILLIAM C. MOORE & COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.

v.

8607

DELFINO SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.

AND
WILLIAM G. MOORE & COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.

v.

8608

ILIFF GARDNER,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
Respondent makes no objection to Appellants' consolidation of the above cases. The issues of law and the pleadings in the two cases are identical, except for an insignifi-
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cant difference in dollars and dates. We will consider the
two cases as one, except where evidence is dealt with.
The letter "R" refers to pages of the record on appeal;
"SR" refers to pages of the supplemental record; "DS"
refers to pages of the deposition of defendant Sanchez, and
"DG" refers to the pages of the deposition of defendant
Gardner.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' statement of facts is inaccurate and unnecessarily involved.
The complaint alleged that the defendant executed an
order in writing, requesting the plaintiff to sell to the
defendant nursery stock; that by the terms of the order the
plaintiff promised to pay a stipulated sum for the nursery
stock, plus shipping charges within five days after shipment and receipt of the stock ; that the plaintiff accepted
the order, and delivered the nursery stock to a common
carrier in 1\Iissouri with directions to transport it to Utah,
and there surrender it to the defendant; that the nursery
stock duly arrived in Utah, and was surrendered to the
defendant, and that the defendant failed to pay for the
stock. The complaint then stated that the order contained
a promise to pay collection costs and expenses, and a reasonable attorney's fee if the account should be placed with
an attorney for collection; that defendant's account was
placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, and that
$75.00 was a reasonable sum to be allowed the plaintiff
for attorney's fees (R. 1, 2).
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a

The answers of the defendants were identical except
for dates and figures. Three numbered defenses were interposed. The first was that the complaint did not state
a cause of action. The second set up that the plaintiff was
a foreign corporation, and has not qualified to do business
in Utah, but was conducting business in this State as though
it were fully qualified. The third consisted of admissions
and denials of parts of the complaint, and also certain affirmative allegations. The only allegations in the complaint
that were controverted were those relating to the contents
of the order and the reasonableness of the attorney's fee.
(We are aware that defendant denies the allegations in
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint, but in each instance
this denial is nullified by an affirmative allegation). Interwoven among the admissions, denials and allegations of
the third defense are some generalizations with respect to
the quality of the stock and representations made at the
time the orders were taken (R. ?, 4, 5). These allegations
will be considered further at a later point in this brief.
The plaintiff moved to strike the second defense from
the defendants' answer upon the ground that it did not
state facts sufficient to constitute a defense (R. 7). A
hearing was had upon this motion, during which certain
facts were admitted by appellants' attorney (SR. 2-12). The
motion to strike was granted (R. 9).
Thereafter, plaintiff moved the court for a summary
judgment in its favor on the ground that no genuine issue
of fact was involved (R. 10). The motion was based upon
the pleadings, the order of the court striking the second
defense, and parts of the deposition of the defendants (R.
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10). The defendants did not appear either in person or b

attorney at the hearing on the motion (R. 12) .

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE SALE OF THE NURSERY STOCK WAS A
TRANSACTION IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
AND IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE
RELATING TO FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
DOING BUSINESS IN UTAH.
POINT II.
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY
MATERIAL FACT AND PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGJ\iiENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SALE OF THE NURSERY STOCK WAS A
TRANSACTION IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE
AND IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE
RELATING TO FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
DOING BUSINESS IN UTAH.
The second defense which was stricken asserted tha
the contract sued upon was void, because the plaintiff,
foreign corporation, was doing business in Utah withou
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having complied with the provisions of Sections 1 to 3,
Chapter 8, Title 16, U. C. A., 1953. These sections provide
in effect that every foreign corporation before doing any
business within this State shall file certain documents in
the Office of the County Clerk. Any foreign corporation
doing business within this State and failing to comply with
the statute cannot maintain any action in the courts of this
~:
~- State on any contract, agreement or transaction made or
~- entered into in Utah by such corporation. Such contract,
t
agreement or transaction is void as to the foreign corpora:~\
tion, but enforceable against it.
It is the contention of respondent that the statute referred to has no application to the transaction sued upon
for the reason that in selling the nursery stock the plaintiff was engaged in interstate commerce. This statute makes
void only contracts made or entered into in the State of
t· Utah. The contract sued upon was not made or entered
into in the State of Utah, but was made and entered into
in a foreign state. The record is plain and uncontroverted
to the effect that the order for the nursery stock was signed
by the defendant in Utah and transmitted to the plaintiff
in New York (R. 1-5; SR. 4-6; DS; DG.). The order provided that it should become a binding contract only after
its receipt at the home office of the seller and when signed
or approved by an executive of the seller, also that "this
sale is made and is to be performed in the State of New
York" (Ex. A. See SR. 5). The nursery stock was delivered to a common carrier outside of the State of Utah
with instructions to transport it to the defendant and deliver it to him in Utah (SR. 6). The stock was received
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by the defendant from the common carrier, and was plantE
by him (DS. 4, 5; DG. 14-16).
Both the decisions of this court and of the Supren
Court of the United States have held that the transactio
involved in the case at bar constitutes interstate commer<
and is not and cannot be made invalid or unenforceable b
a state statute which makes void any contract made in Uta
by a foreign corporation doing business in this State witl
out a license.
In Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., Inc. v. Stohl, 7
Utah 124, 283 Pac. 731, the question involved was whethe
the sale of a threshing machine was a transaction in inte1
state commerce. The seller was a foreign corporation whic
had not complied with the laws of Utah relating to foreig
corporations doing business in this State. The order fo
the machinery was solicited by a representative of the selle
and was signed by the buyer in Utah. The order was the
trans1nitted to the seller in Indiana. The order provide
that it would not be binding upon the seller until accepte
by it at its office in Indiana. The machinery was shippe
from Indiana to Utah and there delivered to the buyer. J
representative of the seller came to Utah to assemble tb
machine and put it in working condition. Upon this stat
of facts, this court held :
"From this evidence we are convinced the tranl
action in suit is an interstate one. The order w~
signed in Utah, sent to the Idaho branch office, an
accepted by the company in Indiana. Cooper Mil
Co. v. Ferguson. 113 U. S. 727, 5 S. Ct. 739, 28 1
Ed. 1137. "''e are also satisfied that the work <
setting up the machinery by experts of vendor a11
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the adjusting of the same in order to make it work
satisfactorily, although performed in this state, did
not make the transaction an intrastate one as distinguished from interstate. The question is a federal one, and we are bound by the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States. Defendant cites
and relies on the case of Browning v. City of Waycross, 233 U. S. 16, 34 S. Ct. 578, 58 L. Ed. 828, but,
since the decision in that case, the Supreme Court
of the United States has fully settled the matter in
the case of York Mfg Co. v. Colley, 247 U. S. 21, 38
S. Ct. 430, 62 L. Ed. 963, 11 A. L. R. 611, distinguishing the Browning Case. It was there held,
citing the headnote, as follows:
" 'A provision in a contract of sale of an
artificial ice plant by which the foreign corporate seller agreed to furnish an engineer who
should assemble and erect the machinery at the
point of destination, and should make a practical efficiency test before complete delivery, is
relevant and appropriate to the interstate sale
of the machinery, and, therefore, does not justify the courts of the state to which the machinery was shipped in refusing to enforce payment of the purchase price, on the theory that
the corporation was doing local business in the
state without having first secured the permit
made by a state statute a condition precedent
to the right to sue in the local courts.'
"The facts in the instant case bring it fully
within the decision of York Mfg. Co. v. Colley, supra.
Other cases in point are Pfaudler Co. v. Westphal, 190
Wis. 486, 209 N. W 700; Kaw Boiler Works Co. v.
Interstate Refineries, Inc., 118 Kan. 693, 236 P. 654.
"The mere fact that notes and mortgages were
executed in Utah does not take the transaction out
of interstate commerce any more than if cash had
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been paid instead of the notes given. The executior
of these documents is an incident to the original sale
Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Spokesman Pub. Co.
127 Or. 196, 270 P. 519. The transaction involve(
in this case being an interstate one, the plaintiff if
entitled to maintain its action notwithstanding i1
has never complied with the laws of the state witb
respect to foreign corporations doing business withir
the state. Sioux Remedy Co. v Cope, 235 U. S. 197:
35 S. Ct. 57, 59 L. Ed. 193."
To the same effect are Miller Brewing Company v.
Capitol Distributing Company, 94 Utah 43, 72 P. 2d 1056;
Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Company v. Weber Packin~
Corp., 94 Utah 414, 73 P. 2d 1272; Riley Stoker Corp. v
State Tax Commission, 3 Utah 2d 164, 280 P. 2d 967.
As this court has pointed out, the decisions of thE
Supreme Court of the United States are controlling upor
the question of what transactions constitute interstate com
merce That court has repeatedly decided that a transactior
such as was had between the plaintiff and defendant ir
this case constitutes interstate commerce, and that th«
Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution prohibits th«
several states from imposing any burdens thereon, or de
nying a party to such transaction the right to enforce thl
contract in the state courts.
In Internatio'nal Textbook Co.

v. Pigg, 217 U. S.

91

30 Sup. Ct. 481, 54 L. Ed. 678, the plaintiff conducted :
correspondence school in Pennsylvania. It employed solici
tors in Kansas to procure students in Kansas to subscrib
to the course. The student executed in Kansas an order fo
the textbooks and courses of instruction, which order wa
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I

1

sent by mail to the plaintiff's office in Pennsylvania. The
coures of study, the textbooks, and paraphernalia were then
shipped by the plaintiff from Pennsylvania to Kansas by
common carrier. The plaintiff's solicitors were paid a fixed
salary and commission, and they collected from the students
the tuition fees for the course of study. Kansas had a statute similar to our own statutes above cited, which required
foreign corporations before doing business in Kansas to
file certain documents and obtain a license. Like the Utah
statute, the Kansas statute provided that a non-complying
foreign corporation could not maintain any action in any
of the courts of Kansas on any contract made by the foreign
corporation who had not complied with the statute.
The plaintiff brought suit in a State court of Kansas
to collect the tuition fee from a student who had received
and used the course of instruction, but who refused to pay
upon the ground that the plaintiff had not complied with
the above mentioned Kansas statute. The Supreme Court
held that the contract between the plaintiff and defendant
was part and parcel of an interstate transaction, that the
Kansas statute imposed an unlawful burden upon such
interstate transaction, and expressly decided that the attempt of Kansas to deny plaintiff access to its courts for
the enforcement of the contract was a violation of the Federal Constitution. The court said :
"It is the established doctrine of this court that
a State may not, in any form or under any guise,
directly burden the prosecution of interstate business. But such a burden is imposed when the corporation of another State, lawfully engaged in interstate commerce, is required, as a condition of its
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right to prosecute its business in Kansas, to mak,
and file a Statement setting forth certain fact
which the State, confessedly, could not control b;
legislation. It results that the provision as to th~
Statement mentioned in §1283 must fall before th~
Constitution of the United States, and with it-ac
cording to the established rules of statutory con
struction-must fall that part of the same sectim
which provides that the obtaining of the certificau
of the Secretary of State that such Statement hru
been properly made shall be a condition precedent t<
the right of the plaintiff to maintain an action ir
the courts of Kansas. * * *"
The International Textbook case has been followed anc
approved in so many cases that it would require pages oj
this brief to cite.
We do not concede that there is any possibility of thE
defendants' counsel being able to sustain his sweeping clairr.
that the plaintiff has been extensively engaged in busines~
in Utah. The point is that it is immaterial whether thE
plaintiff was engaged in business in Utah without a license,
Regardless of its activities in Utah outside of the transactions with the defendants, the Constitution of the United
States requires that those transactions be upheld.
Defendants' counsel had no answer to the trial court'~
observation that the most the defendants could probabl~
prove was that the plaintiff had engaged in a number o1
interstate transactions similar to those sued upon in thesE
actions (SR. 8) .
The question presented by the motion to strike is no·
whether the issue of doing business in Utah is one of fac·
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to be determined after trial. The controlling inquiry is
whether that issue is immaterial. The authorities to the
effect that the transaction is interstate in character demonstrate that the issue is immaterial. Appellants' brief completely ignores the point.

POINT II.
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY
MATERIAL FACT AND PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
Appellant's brief touching the above point consists
almost entirely of citations of authorities which announce
.the elementary proposition that a summary judgment can
be sustained in only those cases where no genuine issue of
fact is involved. There is no discussion of any claimed issue
of fact in this case other than the bare assertion that the
answer put in issue "the question as to whether or not there
had been a complete failure of consideration in the delivery
of the goods to the defendant," also "the question of damages due to the misrepresentations and misstatements of
the agents of the plaintiff."
We submit that the asserted issues with respect to
failure of consideration and misrepresentation exist only in
appellant's brief. Neither of these defenses was presented
in the defendant's answer. Each is an affirmative defense
and must be set forth in the answer (Rule 12 (b) U. R. C.
P.).
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All that is there stated with respect to consideration
is that said "purported nursery stock was of no value as
nearly all of said stock was dead upon arrival," and a denial that "any award of attorney's fees should be made
in that there has been a complete failure of consideration
in the goods as shipped by plaintiff to defendant" (R. 3-5).
These allegations are not sufficient to raise the issue of
failure of consideration. See County v. Hobbs, 72 Iowa 69,
33 N. W. 368, 17 C. J. S. Section 555, page 1190.
The plea of fraud is likewise insufficient to present
any defense. Rule 9 (b) U. R. C. P. requires that in all
averments of fraud the circumstances constituting the fraud
must be stated with particularity. These circumstances or
elements of fraud which must be particularly stated are
that the representation must be of a fact as distinguished
from opinions, conclusions and sales talk. Stuck v. Delta
Land & Water Company, 63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791. Second
the representations must be reasonably relied upon. Lewis
v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 P. 2d 865, and damage must
have resulted from the reliance upon the representations.
Baird v. E.flo Investment Company, 76 Utah 232, 289 P.
112; Campbell v. Zions Cooperative Home Building & Real
Estate Company, 46 Utah 1, 148 Pac. 401.
While the above authorities fully sustain our position
that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment on the pleadings, there are additional grounds to support the judgment
appealed from. The motion for summary judgment was
based upon the depositions of the defendants, as well as
upon the pleadings and other matters of record. A reference to the depositions is all that is necessary to dispose of
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any claimed defense based upon either failure of consideration or fraud. With respect to the condition of the nursery
stock upon its arrival, defendant Gardner admitted that the
stock corresponded exactly to that order and was in proper
condition for planting (DG. 14-17). All of it was planted,
and all of it grew (DG. 19-23). It is true that there
is some testimony that a small part of the stock winter
killed, which was undoubtedly due to the very unusual
winter which followed the planting. This defendant's testimony precludes any possible finding that any part of the
stock was dead upon arrival. He never notified the plaintiff or made any complaint that any of the stock was dead,
or that it failed to grow, and no request was made for any
replacement (DG. 19-23).
Although the deposition of defendant Sanchez is contradictory and uncertain in some respects, it is clear to the
effect that he planted all of the stock, and that only a few
items failed to grow (DS. 5-7). He also failed to make any
complaint or request any replacements (DS. 8).
The contract provides that plaintiff will replace all
nursery stock that fails to live the first year, provided the
purchaser has paid as agreed and the stock was promptly
planted on arrival and given proper care (Ex. A). It provides further that no cash discount or refund is allowed for
any nursery stock that does not grow (Ex. A). In view of
these provisions of the contract and the facts admitted by
the defendants in their depositions, any defense predicated
upon failure of consideration fails as a matter of law.
The consideration for the defendant's promise to pay
was the plaintiff's promise to transfer the list of nursery
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stock and to replace any of the stock that failed to grow
the first year. The plaintiff has not failed or refused to
perform its undertaking. It has never received any notice
that any of the stock failed to grow the first year, and no
request for replacement has ever been made. Since the plaintiff is not in default under the contract, there has been no
failure of consideration.
The recent decision of this court in Van Tassell, et al.
v. Lew-is, et al., 118 Utah 356, 222 P. 2d 350, is in point
upon the question of claimed failure of consideration. This
was an action to set aside a deed from the plaintiff Van
Tassell to the defendant Lewis covering real property in
Duchesne County. The consideration for the conveyance
was the undertaking of the defendant to pay a certain sum
of money and perform other acts. The promise to perform
one of these acts was made after the conveyance. The other
acts were performed and the money was paid. This court
held there was no failure of consideration. We quote from
the opinion :
"In order for the plaintiffs to prevail in this
action brought by them to cancel their deed to the
Duchesne property on the ground that there has
been a failure of consideration for the conveyance,
it is incumbent upon them to demonstrate that they
have not received everything that they bargained for
as payment for that property. * * *"
This is the situation presented in the case under consideration. The plaintiff is not in default and has not
refused to comply with its promise to replace any stock
that failed to grow, because it has never been notified that
any of the stock failed to grow and has never been requested
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to replace any of it. Even if it be assumed that the pleadings raise an issue with respect to failure of consideration,
the depositions of the defendants conclusively establish that
the defense is not available to the defendants.
The depositions of the defendants likewise dispose of
any defense based upon fraud, even if we indulge the violent
assumption that such a defense was raised by the pleadings.
Each defendant was positive that no representations with
respect to the quality or character of the nursery stock
was made by any representative of the plaintiff (DS. 8-9;
DG. 27). Gardner did testify that some statements were
made with respect to the price or value of the stock, but
these constituted no more than mere opinions and "puffing"
statements (DG. 27, 28). The authorities above cited demonstrate that no actionable misrepresentation was made,
and that a defense predicated upon fraud cannot be sustained.
Rule 56 (c) provides that a judgment shall forthwith
be rendered upon motion if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. The pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file in this case show no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and plaintiff was entitled to
a judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court committed no error in striking the ailE
ations in the answer to the effect that plaintiff was doin,
business in Utah without a license. These allegations ar
immaterial and constituted no defense to the plaintiff'
claim.
No error was committed in granting the plaintiff'
subsequent motion for a summary judgment in its favor
Under the pleadings, the depositions and admissions, n~
genuine issue of fact was presented, and plaintiff was en
titled to recover as a matter of law.
We respectfully submit that the judgment should b1
affirmed.
GRANT H. BAGLEY and
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR., for
VAN COTT BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Attorneys for Plaintiff

and Respondent
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